

To hate or not to hate is no dilemma; hatred is self-righteously apodictic. And given the moral and semantic stench that is now polluting Eastern Europe, a variety of euphemisms of neo-fascist hue dress the basest instincts with deceptive decor. While the author focuses especially on Hungary, Romania, Poland, the former siamese-twin nation of Czechoslovakia, and Germany, he tries to find some common threads that apply throughout the former Soviet empire.

One common theme is the refuge of nationalism, which Hockenos explains, as does Erich Fromm, as a kind of "new submission [whereby] the individual relieves himself of the burdens of individuality and freedom." And surely one can understand the sense of terror that accompanied the cataclysmic change resulting from the end of communism, from the ubiquitous anarchy absent a judicial system worth the name, and the collapse of economies based on lies. Hatred is after all but a form of fear. The flight from the burden of self and choice, though deadly, is only natural.

Hockenos, the Central and Eastern European correspondent for *In These Times*, approaches his subject with empathy and commitment. He interviewed dozens of people in the countries that he visited since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and his insights are essentially accurate. He describes, for example, the various nuances within the Hungarian Democratic Forum, not overestimating the political clout of its infamous poet-playwright Istvan Csaruka, the leader of its chauvinist wing. It is correct, as Hockenos explains, that the HDF is "typical of the emergent conservative ideologies throughout freshly liberated Eastern Europe [insofar as] an ethnic concept of the nation was the very cornerstone of [its] raison d'être." The HDF looked back on the golden age of Hungary's past—as did the Hungarian Party of National Unity, other even more virulent political groups in Romania, and the Christian National Union in Poland.

This fixation with history appears to play a palliative role, as a kind of fantasy at the expense of the "inferior" others, to distract one from the hard reality of choice and poverty, of one's common humanity. The pseudo-intellectual Czech group of Skinheads, for example, who call themselves the New Czech Unity, target their hatred especially at the "Gypsy parasites." So, incidentally, do virtually all other nationalist groups in East-Central Europe. This Unity campaign is coupled with an anti-alcohol and anti-drug attitude based loosely on Bohemian myths from the Middle Ages. Evidently, the group exemplifies a fairly widespread attempt at creating a moral context for behavior in a free world; but the attempt derails into bigotry, even violence.

Despite the relatively small number of politically active nationalist parties, their influence is considerable. Romania is a primary example, where the Party of National Unity together with the extreme Greater Romania Party and the neocommunist Socialist Labor Party have wielded the necessary power to form what is essentially a coalition with the ruling party of president Ion Iliescu (which is now somewhat disingenuously named the "Party for Social Democracy"). Hockenos does a commendable job of analyzing the complex political landscape in that Balkan country.

In essence, the book succeeds well as a kind of travelogue that assesses seriously, if a bit impressionistically, the political landscape in Eastern Europe. Its major flaw rests primarily on a hopelessly confused definition of "the right." Hockenos acknowledges that the term is very complex, and notes that in the West the right has been identified with the ideals of the free market and individual freedom, citing Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan as two prominent figures of the Western "right." By contrast, in the East, Hockenos points out, the right has decidedly authoritarian, even fascist overtones. So far so good. But having understood this divergence, Hockenos succumbs to complete confusion as he proceeds to create a denotation for the term so central to his subject.

He first states that he "feels that the democratic ideals of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] Paris Charter are positive" (without explaining how that affects the definition of the term "right"); then he justifies his "omission of the likes of Reagan and Thatcher" (from the definition of the word "right"? Again, it isn't clear) by noting that this is "offset by the fact that they have few equivalents in Eastern Europe." By implication, this seems to mean that his definition of "the right" is not the Western sense. So one more or less knows what it is not. But then what is it, exactly?

To further illustrate his confusion, Hockenos offers the example of Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus as a radical free marketeer in the Thatcherist mold with "a questionable commitment to human rights and democratic procedure." Nevertheless, he generously "decline[s] to put Klaus in the league of Eastern Europe's old school of nationalists and extreme rightists"—but with a qualification: "This is not to say," writes Hockenos, "that someone like Klaus or Reagan (or better yet Patrick Buchanan) couldn't overstep the line that I have drawn." Never mind that no such line is visible. And what would it mean even to refer to such a "line"? Does Hockenos mean to suggest that Klaus's classical liberalism is only a shade away from authoritarianism?

Indeed, to suggest even for a second that classical liberal economist Vaclav Klaus has anything at all in common with the virulent anti-market, xenophobic extreme nationalists is nothing short of silly. Klaus has never flinched from his commitment to classical natural rights, both civil and political. To be sure, he opposes labeling as "economic rights" the social benefits provided in most countries through the largess of government. And here evidently is the root of the problem. For Hockenos seems unfamiliar with the traditional distinction between negative and positive rights, collapsing both as "human rights," to which he feels committed. Accordingly, he seems incapable of understanding either Western conservative or libertarian thought (he does not, of course, use the latter term at all); and his analysis is based on philosophical quicksand.

His final chapter, appropriately called "Anti-semitism without Jews," offers a sad commentary on that lingering ancient problem in the aftermath of a Holocaust that has not been adequately explained within the lands where it actually happened. The distortion of history that took place under Marxism-Leninism touched the Jews as well. It dealt with their ancestral existence

in Eastern Europe simply and lethally: by total silence—which was itself a kind of “final solution” that was in effect as devastating to the reality of Judaism as Nazi barbarism. The people of Eastern Europe today are thus unable to appreciate all of what happened, or why; they cannot quite fit themselves into the puzzle, and continue to harbor animosities against a people they never quite understood. But Hockenos does not end on a hopeless note, for there are lessons to be learned and progress is possible. He concludes: “The states that provide their minorities full political and cultural rights, that grant their peoples and regions more autonomy, that practice multiculturalism will in the long run be more democratic and stable.” No classical liberal would disagree.

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**Property Rights and the Constitution: Shaping Society Through Land Use Regulation**

Dennis J. Coyle

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From zoning’s earliest days, the regulation of society through the regulation of land use has proved an irresistible temptation to many conservatives as well as to modern liberals.

The conservatives apparently were glad to relinquish judicial protection for private property rights in exchange for zoning protection for middle- and upper-middle-class residential and commercial districts. Thus the Supreme Court’s imprimatur on sweeping land use controls in *Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company* (1926) was bestowed by Justice George Sutherland, a champion of freedom of contract and substantive due process. Sutherland’s opinion, replete with references to the apartment house in the single-family residential neighborhood as a “mere parasite,” casually analogized land use controls to nuisance regulation. Modern liberals, from the Progressive reformers on, happily anticipated that the slums would be eradicated and Utopia would arise not from individual initiative or even from the democratic vote of the people, but from the expert ministrations of scientifically trained city planners.

Almost seventy years after *Euclid*, we find that land use regulation has indeed been destructive of property rights and also has hindered upward mobility. In its local and statewide administration it combines the stupefaction of bureaucracy with occasional swerves of judicial adventurism. Nevertheless, regulation remains popular with suburban homeowners anxious to protect their principal investment. It also retains the loyalty of planners and elected officials who, like the apparatchicks of the Brezhnev era, have lost the true faith but recognize the path to self-advancement.

Dennis Coyle, who teaches in the Department of Politics at the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., retells the story with particular emphasis on the jurisprudence of California, New Jersey, and Pennsyl-