These sales have a net negative impact on U.S. security and global human rights. U.S. weapons sales can lead to arms dispersion to cartels and terrorists, empower dictators, and help aid in serial violations of human rights.

There are three major problems with the current U.S. weapons sales process. First, it does not incorporate the risks of arms sales into the review process (see Figure 1). Risks include discounting of human rights, state fragility, authoritarianism, and participation in a conflict. Second, Congress lacks authority to regulate sales effectively, giving the executive branch unrivaled power over the process. Third, after an arms transfer, Washington lacks the mechanisms and capability to track them, especially for SALW sales.

Given the scope and complexity of the U.S. arms sales process, it is impossible to examine every case in which American weapons are used improperly. Instead, this chapter will examine these problems and offer policy recommendations. Solving the issues at hand will mitigate the risks involved in arms sales and better protect U.S. interests.

Four factors inform the risks of arms sales: corruption, instability, domestic human rights abuses, and conflict. Yet the United States frequently ignores these factors. Since 2009, Washington’s top 10 customers have included risky countries like Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (see Table 1). These sales have aided human rights abuses and war crimes in Yemen, led to weapons falling into the hands of ISIS, and facilitated military attacks against citizens.

Not all U.S. arms sales present these sorts of risks. The United States also sells its most expensive weapons platforms (like the F‑35) to less risky countries, such as Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. Nor is the United States the only country selling to risky recipients (see Figure 2). Authoritarian countries like China and Russia sell to riskier countries than does America. U.S. allies do too, with France, Italy, and South Korea selling to riskier clients than the United States.

Still, the United States has a responsibility to lead by example and match its actions to its rhetoric. As President Biden notes, Washington’s diplomacy should be “rooted in America’s most cherished democratic values: defending freedom, championing opportunity, upholding universal rights, respecting the rule of law, and treating every person with dignity.” Current U.S. weapons transfer policies do the opposite and, as a result, open the door to entanglement (involving the United States in a conflict) and dispersion (weapons falling into the wrong hands).

Recent examples include the Saudi intervention in Yemen and weapons dispersion in Central America’s Northern Triangle. In Yemen, Riyadh uses U.S. ammunition and warheads with laser guidance to target innocent civilians. Selling weapons to a country that abuses human rights at home or abroad directly opposes the Biden administration’s strategy to build a foreign policy based on democratic values.

The story is no better in Central America’s Northern Triangle, which contains some of the highest crime areas in the world. According to a study conducted by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, a total of 27,240 firearms were recovered in Central America’s Northern Triangle, of which nearly 57.6 percent were made outside the United States. Weapons made in the United States made up 40.1 percent of the total; of these firearms, 39.1 percent were traced to a nonoriginal purchaser and only 43.6 percent were traced to the party who purchased the weapons through American federal firearms sales (see Figure 3). The same study found that Washington spent over $38 million trying to disrupt this dispersion. In other words, U.S. weapons are used by gangs to commit murder. Lack of oversight prior to sales likely led to criminal misuse and a costly post hoc cleanup effort paid for by the U.S. taxpayer.

Although problematic, these incidents underscore the need for the United States to move away from selling arms to risky countries and toward a more responsible weapons sales policy. The first step is to incorporate metrics to measure the risk of weapons sales on which to base these policy changes, such as requiring the State Department to issue public risk assessments or by creating an oversight board that evaluates every sale, in addition to the State Department’s analysis. The world’s riskiest countries should receive no weapons, even if they are current clients. Further, countries that receive weapons and are at risk of dispersion or violations of human rights should demonstrate improved handling of these issues before receiving more U.S. weapons. Finally, this review process should be publicized so constituents can understand the risks of selling weapons to dangerous countries. Incorporating risk into arms sales decisions is a simple solution, but it will have an outsized impact on avoiding risk from current U.S. arms sales policy. The goal is not to prevent all sales but to identify and stop those that could pose threats to U.S. security in the future.

This change, however, will not be effective without further empowering policymakers and policy implementers. A current lack of congressional influence and limited end-use monitoring capabilities prevent such action.

The current arms export system—as defined in the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act and 1976 Arms Export Control Act—gives Congress the ability to stop a sale 30 calendar days before a transfer of equipment valued at $14 million or more. Additionally, Congress can stop a sale of firearms controlled under category 1 of the U.S. Munitions List (a type of SALW) 30 calendar days before a transfer of equipment, as long as it is valued at $1 million or more. To do so, Congress must pass a joint resolution of disapproval. Yet because of the difficulty of overriding a presidential veto of a disapproval resolution, Congress has rarely voted to block an arms sale. When it has, those attempts have always been overturned by the president’s veto.

This process is slow and difficult. Many sales of SALW are less than $1 million, skirting congressional oversight. The executive branch and weapons manufacturers can put together packages of sales for $999,999 and avoid notifying Congress. As a result, many lethal weapons are sold in small packages valued below $1 million. Congress often does not know about such sales, let alone have any mechanism through which to stop the process. Beyond that, 30 days is not much time. This is especially true in the House of Representatives because there is no method for a House member to force the House Foreign Affairs Committee to debate stopping a sale, which allows this legislation to die in committee.

Recently, the president has superseded Congress through emergency declarations. Former president Donald Trump was able to prevent Congress from stopping sales to Saudi Arabia multiple times. He first did so in May 2019 by declaring the sales to be an emergency-use authorization, or when a sale is in the immediate national security interests of the United States. The president can make such a declaration under the claim that a certain sale or group of sales is classified as an emergency and thus circumvents the 30-day rule. In another instance, President Trump simply vetoed a congressional resolution of disapproval in July 2019. Because Congress needs to pass a resolution disapproving of the president’s sale, the president can veto Congress’s joint resolution of disapproval. The legislature, therefore, needs two-thirds majorities in both the House and Senate to stop a sale.

Congress could make two major changes to current arms sales policy that could help reduce risks in sales. First, Congress should pass legislation reducing the threshold at which the president must notify the legislature. Many SALW packages are sold for under $1 million. By lowering this number, Congress will be able to stop dangerous sales in the Northern Triangle and other fragile regions.

Still, the most important change that policymakers can make is flipping the script on the sales process. The president holds all the power over arms sales, relegating Congress to a rubber-stamping role. Instead, if all arms sales are null unless Congress approves the sale, the presidential veto threat will no longer exist. Those supporting the sale, therefore, will need to defend it publicly, which will pose a greater challenge for the riskiest of sales.

An additional benefit to this policy is that, if Congress decides a sale is in U.S. interests, it would pass a resolution of approval. For example, on April 25, 2022, President Biden notified Congress about a $165 million sale of nonstandard ammunition—such as grenades and grenade launchers—to Ukraine. Given Congress’s near-unanimous support for arming Ukraine, if legislation had already flipped the script on arms sales, it likely would have passed a resolution of approval. Flip-the-script legislation empowers Congress to make decisions on weapons sales, and this makes that process more democratic.

The United States does not adequately monitor weapons and prevent dispersion, partially because the Trump administration placed the monitoring and regulating of most SALW under the Commerce Department’s jurisdiction, moving it away from the State Department. In Central America, the consequences are severe. A 2022 Government Accountability Office study found that the Commerce Department conducted only two end-use checks in the Northern Triangle in 2021. In the six previous years, when the State Department conducted end-use monitoring checks, it found 130 firearms, 3,500 firearm components, and 217,000 rounds of ammunition destined for illicit transfers to Central America.

Beyond SALW, monitoring major weapons systems is a challenge in other parts of the world. For example, on May 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia used U.S. bombs to bomb a school. These systems have been sold to Saudi Arabia since 2008, per the U.S. Department of Defense. As a result, poor monitoring by the United States has resulted in deaths of innocent civilians in Yemen. The United States clearly lacks the proper infrastructure to monitor the weapons it sends to high-risk areas. This deficiency allows U.S. weapons to end up in the hands of cartels, terrorists, and other anti-American groups, unbeknownst to the American government.

In the worst cases, loose weapons are used to violate human rights or harm Americans. For example, before the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, a U.S. military investigation into the Taliban’s killing of two Americans found that there was a “distinct possibility” that the Taliban had used U.S.-made SALW in the attack. Policymakers should move SALW monitoring back to the State Department. Although the previous system was imperfect, improving monitoring of small arms that go to fragile states helps Washington avoid future headaches. Problems with bureaucratic oversight of U.S. weapons after delivery often result in millions of dollars spent and hours wasted in recovering dispersed weapons.

Not only should the United States trace its weapons after delivery, but so should recipient countries. Agreements like the Arms Trade Treaty provide an avenue for doing so, as similar requirements can be written into arms sales agreements themselves. Rather than spend tens of millions of dollars recovering weapons, Washington should mandate that the recipient ensures their safety or faces repercussions. By working with other countries to institute such processes, policymakers can certify that American bureaucratic organizations know how to track weapons in places where governments are more likely to stop weapons dispersion and selling arms to recipients with poor human rights records.

Washington discounts risk in weapons sales, and doing so comes with consequences. Over the past 15 years, U.S. weapons sales have aided human rights abusers, countries at war, and fragile and corrupt states.

There is a better option. Preventing presidents from unilaterally selling weapons to whomever they choose and monitoring where U.S. arms end up will help avoid these problems. Policymakers need to reform the weapons sales process. Doing so will positively affect U.S. security.

Cohen, Jordan. “Biden’s Conventional Arms Transfer Policy Review Could Be a Turning Point.” War on the Rocks, November 29, 2021.

Government Accountability Office. “Export Controls: State and Commerce Should Share Watch List Information if Proposed Rules to Transfer Firearms Are Finalized.” GAO-19–307, March 2018.

———. “Firearms Trafficking: More Information Is Needed to Inform U.S. Efforts in Central America.” GAO 22–104680, January 2022.

Thrall, A. Trevor, and Jordan Cohen. “2021 Arms Sales Risk Index.” Cato Institute, January 18, 2022.

Thrall, A. Trevor, Jordan Cohen, and Caroline Dorminey. “Power, Profit, or Prudence? US Arms Sales since 9/11.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 14, no. 2 (2020): 100–126.