Axis of Evil: Threat or Chimera?
by Charles V. Peña
Summer 2002
Charles V. Pena is senior defense policy analyst at the Cato Institute.
On 20 September 2001, before a joint session of Congress, President Bush addressed the American people and named Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. He also condemned the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for aiding and abetting al Qaeda. Bush said: "Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them"1 and that the war on terrorism "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."2 Ostensibly, the only terrorist group with demonstrated global reach was (and still is) al Qaeda.
In an October radio address to the nation, the rhetoric began to shift slightly and subtly when the president stated that "America is determined to oppose the state sponsors of terror"3 and that the "enemy is the terrorists themselves, and the regimes that shelter and sustain them."4 And instead of a war against terrorist groups with global reach, Bush spoke of a "global campaign against terror."5
In a November Rose Garden ceremony welcoming back aid workers Heather Mercer and Dayna Curry rescued from Afghanistan, President Bush remarked: "If anybody harbors a terrorist, they're a terrorist. If they fund a terrorist, they're a terrorist. If they house terrorists, they're terrorists… If they develop weapons of mass destruction that will be used to terrorize nations, they will be held accountable."6 Thus, the president linked the war on terrorism to weapons of mass destruction, claiming that countries that develop weapons of mass destruction were always part of his definition of terrorists.7 And he specifically cited Iraq and North Korea as needing to allow inspectors into their respective countries. In response to a question about the consequences for Saddam Hussein if he did not allow inspectors into Iraq, Bush said: "He'll find out,"8 which had a similar tone to the demands placed on the Taliban on September 20 and fueled speculation that the administration was planning military action against Iraq.
The rhetoric about rogue states and weapons of mass destruction was used again when President Bush addressed cadets at the Citadel in December: "Rogue states are clearly the most likely sources of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons for terrorists."9 And Bush was explicit about expanding the war on terrorism: "America's next priority to prevent mass terror is to protect against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them."10
In his State of the Union address on January 29, President Bush did not make a single direct reference either to al Qaeda or Osama bin Laden. Seemingly forgotten were previous comments about wanting bin Laden "dead or alive."11 Instead, he stated that the United States would be "steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world."12 The president specifically named North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as regimes that "constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world"13 and that "by seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger." 14
Yet little over a week after the president named the axis of evil, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and said that "Al Qaeda leaders still at large are working to reconstitute the organization and to resume its terrorist operations"15 and that the al Qaeda terrorist network was still "the most immediate and serious threat"16 to the United States. Subsequently, the New York Times reported that Abu Zubaydah, a 30-year-old Palestinian, had become al Qaeda's new chief of operations and was believed to be organizing remnants of terrorist network. According to the New York Times, American investigators "were convinced that Mr. Zubaydah was now trying to activate al Qaeda sleeper cells for new strikes on the United States and its allies."17 According to FBI Director Robert Mueller: "We believe that we are still targeted, that there are al Qaeda associates or individuals around the world and some in the United States that are intent on committing terrorist acts within the country."18
And in early March, U.S. forces were engaged in what was described as the fiercest fighting to date against al Qaeda and Taliban forces in the Gardez mountain region in the Paktia province of Afghanistan. During the opening days of Operation Anaconda, 8 Americans were killed by enemy fire.19 Clearly, as one senior defense department official said, "The war isn't over, we've got a lot of work to do."20
But if al Qaeda still represents an immediate and serious threat -- including cells in the United States -- and the war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan is not yet over, why then has President Bush expanded the war on terrorism to include the axis of evil? According to Bush, "North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens."21 He asserts that "Iran aggressively pursues these weapons [of mass destruction] and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom."22 And the president contends that "Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade."23
Just as tends to happen with military operations, the rhetoric surrounding the war on terrorism has been subject to "mission creep." And the escalating rhetoric has allowed the Bush administration to expand the war with virtually no question or opposition --despite the fact that the joint resolution by Congress was more limited and specific: That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or persons.24
The first step was the joint U.S.-Philippine military training exercise against the Abu Sayef guerrillas on the island of Basilan. But the Abu Sayef are a small (less than 100) group of militant Islamic separatists in the Philippines who are more kidnappers-for-money than terrorists -- and it would be hard to prove that the Abu Sayef are al Qaeda or were involved in the September 11 attacks.25 So such U.S. action is more to assist the Philippine government with a long-standing domestic problem rather than taking action as prescribed by the congressional joint resolution. The same may also be true for the U.S. decision to provide similar assistance to the Republic of Georgia where al Qaeda is claimed to be operating in the Pankisi Gorge near the Russian border.26 But the al Qaeda in Georgia are more likely al Qaeda-trained separatist Chechen rebels. Moreover, Georgia's acceptance of U.S. military training may be more to protect against Russia27 and to possibly aid operations in the separatist Abkhazia region28 -- neither of which fit the mission or authorization of the congressional joint resolution.29
The real danger with inflamed rhetoric about the axis of evil is that given the mission creep to date and virtually no opposition to how the president has expanded the war on terrorism, the foundation has been laid for the United States to engage in military operations against any opponent of its own choosing -- without congressional approval and regardless of whether such action has anything to do with al Qaeda and preventing further attacks against the United States. Indeed, that al Qaeda is no longer central to the war on terrorism is evidenced by the fact that the Basque separatist movement E.T.A. has been added to the list of organizations that the Bush administration is taking financial action against as part of the war on terrorism30 and that the U.S. war on drugs has been combined with the war on terrorism in Colombia.31
North Korea, Iran, and Iraq Are Not an Axis
Obviously, the most immediate image that comes to mind by characterizing North Korea, Iran, and Iraq as an axis of evil is the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan during World War II. However, White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer has stated that the president did not mean such a comparison and that the expression was "more rhetorical than historical."32 Nonetheless, the term "axis" means partnership or alliance.33 Whatever the president's intentions, the truth is that North Korea, Iran, and Iraq do not constitute an axis.
It would be extremely difficult to make a case that Iran and Iraq have worked together to advance mutual interests and policies. To begin, there is the important fundamental difference that Iran is governed by a religious Islamic regime while Iraq is a secular Muslim state. More significantly, the two countries have long-standing hatred toward each other and fought a bloody war from 1980 to 1988. Concerned that Iran's new Islamic revolutionary leadership was a threat, Iraq invaded Iran in late 1980. What was supposed to be a quick victory became a protracted war of attrition that saw the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, and claimed an estimated 375,000 Iraqi casualties and at least 300,000 Iranian lives.34 Iraq was deemed to have won the war (which ended when Iran accepted a cease-fire under United Nations Security Council Resolution 598) militarily, but the two countries have remained at odds with each other. Despite several attempts to improve and normalize relations (most recently in January),35 both governments support opposition groups in the other country.
There is no doubt that there is a military assistance relationship between North Korea and Iran. During the 1980-1988 war, Iran received much of its weaponry from North Korea (in fact, it is estimated that Iran accounted for as much as 90 percent of North Korea's arms exports in the early 1980s)36. In return for such military aid, Iran has shipped hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil to North Korea. Much of Iran's current ballistic missile technology is directly from North Korea -- the Iranian Shabab-3 medium range (800-900 miles) missile is considered a version of the North Korean No Dong missile. But arms sales in and of themselves do not necessarily constitute an alliance or partnership between the two countries.37 More likely, they are a simple business transaction with the Iranians gaining wanted weaponry in exchange for the North Koreans getting needed currency38 or oil.
It is also important to view the military assistance relationship between North Korea and Iran in a larger perspective. For example, testimony by Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, mentioned China more than North Korea as providing military aid to Iran.39 And according to one administration official, "North Korea has had more exchanges of missile technology with Pakistan [now a U.S. ally in the war on terrorism] than with Iran."40 So while there may be a relationship between Iran and North Korea, it is certainly not exclusive and it would be difficult to characterize it as a military or political partnership or alliance.
If evidence of an axis-like relationship between North Korea and Iran is thin (at best), such a relationship between North Korea and Iraq is essentially non-existent due to sanctions imposed on Iraq after the Gulf War. The only indication that there might be some cooperative relationship between the two countries is a report in August 2000 that Iraq was financing construction of a Scud missile production facility in Sudan and that North Korean personnel would build and run the plant.41 That there was no mention of this relationship and in the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) most recent Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015 is probably a good indicator that either the arrangement never materialized or that the information provided for the news report was false.42
Weapons of Mass Destruction
The most obvious linkage between North Korea, Iran, and Iraq is their known desires for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver such weapons (especially long-range ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States). But how real and imminent is this potential threat?
According to the CIA, North Korea "is capable of producing and delivering via missile warheads or other munitions a wide variety of chemical agents and possibly some biological agents"43 and "has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons."44 Also according to the CIA, "North Korea has hundreds of Scuds and No Dong missiles and continues to develop the longer range Taepo Dong-2, which will enable the North to target the United States. In May 2001, however, North Korean Leader Kim Jong-il unilaterally extended the North's voluntary flight-test moratorium in effect since 1999 until 2003, provided negotiations with the United States proceeded."45
However, North Korea's production of enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons was acknowledged by the United States as having been done prior to the signing of the Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States in October 199446 whereby North Korea agreed to freeze and dismantle its existing suspect nuclear weapons program. North Korea is apparently continuing to comply with the 1994 agreement. Therefore, the threat is both small and not currently growing.
Furthermore, North Korea's postulated capability to build a ballistic missile capable of reaching the United States is based on a two-stage Taepo Dong-2 missile "believed to consist of four No Dong engines clustered together as the first stage, and a single No Dong as the second stage."47 Not only is such a missile at least five-times more likely to fail than a single-stage No Dong missile (itself far from reliable),48 but also sounds more like something the Wile Y. Coyote cartoon character would think up in his ever futile quest to catch the Roadrunner. And North Korea's ballistic missiles may be intended more for political and propaganda purposes rather than as usable military weapons. According to Joseph S. Bermudez, a leading expert on North Korean missile programs, the August 1998 missile test of the Taepo Dong-2 "made America wake up and pay attention to them [North Korea], which is one of the things they desperately want. They want to be perceived as a powerful nation."49
The CIA reports that "Iran, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) States party,50 already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons -- including blister, blood, choking, and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them."51 And Iran's interest in chemical weapons is most likely a direct result of Iraq using chemical weapons against Iran during their 1980-1988 war. Iran is actively seeking dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise -- ostensibly for civilian uses, but with potential biological warfare applications -- and might have small quantities of biological agents and perhaps a few weapons. Again, however, this is likely as a response to the perceived threat from Iraq. Iran's nuclear program is in its early stages of development and "at this time there are few unambiguous indicators of nuclear intent."52
As previously mentioned, Iran has received ballistic missiles and technology from North Korea and China. Iran has also enlisted the aid of Russian scientists for its ballistic missile program.53 But projections that Iran could develop within 10 years an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of striking the United States are likely overstated.54 And it is not at all clear that Iran's intentions are aimed directly at the United States. According to Gary Samore, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, "There is a big difference between Iranians trying to cover the region, and developing a system that will allow them to attack the U.S. I don't think the Iranians have yet made a fundamental decision about developing an ICBM capability."55 And Clyde Walker, director of the Missile and Space Intelligence Center in Huntsville, Alabama states, "Iran went into this [ballistic missile] business because they got clobbered by Iraq [in the 1980-1988 war]."56 So Iran's concerns and aspirations appear more regional than international, and not a direct challenge or threat to the United States.
Since December 1998, Iraq has refused to allow United Nations weapons inspectors into the country as required by Security Council Resolution 687. In all likelihood, Iraq has used the ensuing period to reconstitute its prohibited WMD programs. According to the CIA, Iraq "has attempted to purchase numerous dual-use items for, or under the guise of, legitimate civilian use. This equipment -- in principle subject to U.N. scrutiny -- also could be diverted for WMD purposes."57 The CIA believes that "Iraq has probably continued low-level theoretical R&D associated with its nuclear program. A sufficient source of fissile material remains Iraq's most significant obstacle to being able to produce a nuclear weapon."58
Iraq may still have a small force of operational short-range al-Husayn missiles (an extended range version of the Soviet Scud-B). Although Iraq may have the infrastructure and know-how to reconstitute its al-Husayn program, attempts at medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles have never gotten beyond the design or initial development stages.59 Therefore, any Iraqi capability to attack the United States is far from certain and likely well into the future. The CIA concludes that "although Iraq could attempt before 2015 to test a rudimentary long-range missile based on its failed Al-Abid SLV [space launch vehicle], such a missile almost certainly would fail."60 In fact, according to the CIA, "Iraq is unlikely to test before 2015 any ICBMs that would the threaten the United States, even if UN prohibitions were eliminated or significantly reduced in the nest few years."61
Undoubtedly, some of Iraq's motivation for seeking to acquire WMD and ballistic missiles is to deter any future potential U.S. military action similar to the Gulf War. But both the CIA and DIA concur that regional power considerations are also a large factor. According to Admiral Wilson, "Saddam's goals remain to reassert sovereignty over all of Iraq, end Baghdad's international isolation, and, eventually, have Iraq reemerge as the dominant regional power."62 And according to the CIA, "Baghdad's goal of becoming the predominant regional power and its hostile relations with many of its neighbors are the key drivers behind Iraq's ballistic missile program."63
Thus, the threat posed by Iraq is less ominous than the rhetoric might suggest. Indeed, according to Admiral Wilson, "Years of U.N. sanctions, embargoes, and inspections, combined with U.S. and Coalition military actions, have significantly degraded Iraq's military capabilities"64 and the "the threat to Coalition Forces is limited."65
In the final analysis, the direct threat of WMD against the United States by North Korea, Iran, or Iraq is currently minimal. While all three countries may have some small WMD capability (probably chemical or biological, but likely not nuclear), none have the long-range delivery capability to attack the United States and such capability is not likely to materialize within the next 10 to 12 years. And if WMD capability is the basis for membership in the axis of evil, then why is it limited to only these three countries when -- according to the Department of Defense -- the extant and emerging threats to the United States, friends, and allies encompasses 12 nations with nuclear weapons programs, 13 nations with biological weapons, 16 nations with chemical weapons, and 28 nations with ballistic missiles?66
Terrorism
The other concern raised by President Bush in naming the axis of evil was terrorism. But to what extent do North Korea, Iran, and Iraq actually sponsor and export terrorism?
To begin, North Korea is no longer an active sponsor of terrorism. Although still on the State Department's list of "state sponsors of terrorism," the only direct linkage to terrorism cited is that North Korea "continued to provide safehaven to the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction members who participated in the hijacking of a Japanese Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970."67 The goal of the Red Army Faction is to overthrow the Japanese government, but with only six hardcore members they can hardly be characterized as a threat to the United States. In a potential allusion to al Qaeda, the State Department also mentions that "Philippine officials publicly declared that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front [MILF] had purchased weapons from North Korea with funds provided by Middle East sources,"68 but this is an allegation and not confirmed. And much like the Abu Sayef guerillas who are the target of a current joint Philippine-U.S. anti-terrorism training mission, the MILF is really an Islamic separatist group and not a direct threat to the United States.
According to the State Department, "Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2000."69 But the groups supported by Iran -- Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and Ahmad Jibril's PFLP-GC focus their terrorist attacks against Israel and do not currently target the United States. Previous attacks against United States targets by Hezbollah were in Lebanon in the early- and mid-1980s in retaliation for the U.S. military presence there.70
The State Department lists the Arab Liberation Front, the inactive 15 May Organization, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Abu Nidal organization (ANO) as having offices in Baghdad. The Arab Liberation Front is just one of many anti-Israel Palestinian groups. The PLF is a splinter group with pro-Palestinian Liberation Organization, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. They have attacked targets in Israel and Egypt, and the group is perhaps best known for its 1985 attack on the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro which resulted in the murder of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. The ANO is an extremist Palestinian organization,71 but according to the State Department has "not attacked Western targets since the late 1980s."72 Like the groups supported by Iran, these groups are anti-Israel and do not currently attack U.S. targets. The other terrorist group supported by Iraq cited by the State Department is Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian terrorist group that "regularly claimed responsibility for armed incursions into Iran that targeted police and military outposts, as well as for mortar and bomb attacks on security organization headquarters in various Iranian cities."73
The bottom line is that the few terrorist groups that receive some support from North Korea, Iran, and Iraq are not direct threats to the United States and those that have previously attacked U.S. targets have not done so for almost 20 years.
More importantly, it has not been demonstrated that North Korea, Iran, or Iraq have any linkages to or have provided support or safe haven to al Qaeda. And none have been shown to be complicit in the planning, financing, or conduct of the September 11 attacks. The one possible linkage is that Mohammed Atta (one of the September 11 suicide hijackers) had two meetings (one in June 2000 and another in April 2001) with Iraqi intelligence officers in Prague, Czech Republic.74 But U.S. officials have stated that the meetings do not constitute hard proof that Iraq was involved in the September 11 attacks;75 NATO secretary-general Lord Robertson told U.S. senators that there was "not a scintilla"76 of evidence linking Iraq with the September 11 attacks, and Israel's chief of military intelligence has stated, "I don't see a direct link between Iraq and the hijackings and terror attacks in the United States."77
Chimera
Unlike the Axis powers of World War II (or the former Soviet Union), Iraq, Iran, and North Korea do not have expansionist designs to dominate the world. None represents a direct threat to the United States. They are economically weak (United States gross domestic product, GDP, was $9.9 trillion in 2000 compared to $15 billion for North Korea, $99 billion for Iran, and $15 billion for Iraq)78 and by all measures of military power (spending, size of forces, technology) they pale in comparison to the United States. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, the United States defense budget was $296 billion for fiscal year 2001. By comparison, North Korea's defense budget was $1.3 billion, Iran's defense budget was $9.1 billion, and Iraq's defense budget was less than $1 billion -- the three countries combined spent less than 4 percent of the total U.S. spending on defense.79 As a result, the United States military is the most modern and technologically advanced in the world, while North Korea, Iraq, and Iran tend to be equipped with older weapons purchased from either the former Soviet Union or China. The bottom line is -- as was demonstrated in the Gulf War and now in Afghanistan -- that the United States currently possesses bone-crushing military dominance over potential adversaries of similar ilk (i.e., the countries of the axis of evil).
If the United States is concerned that North Korea, Iran, or Iraq might be entertaining thoughts of getting in bed with al Qaeda, Afghanistan serves as an object lesson: harbor or assist terrorists who attack the United States and your regime will be summarily crushed and eliminated -- with extreme prejudice. Indeed, given the relatively swift and resounding U.S. military success in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime, it seems more likely that nations will avoid like the plague any direct sponsorship or links to terrorism that could be directed against the United States.
And if the United States is worried about future terrorism, it would be best served not to lump the few terrorist groups (who do not attack the United States) supported by the countries of the axis of evil in with al Qaeda. By taking on such groups (who are dangerous to the regimes and countries that they target), the United States could unwittingly fan the flames of extreme anti-American sentiment and increase the likelihood that they will want to put the United States squarely in their sights. It will be a difficult enough challenge for the United States to eliminate the al Qaeda terrorist network that exists in over 60 countries without creating new enemies that it does not now have.
The crux of the problem is not the axis of evil, but a U.S. policy of constant military intervention in far-flung regions of the world, none of which are vital to U.S. national security interests. Iraq and Iran are only considered threats because the United States continues to believe in the myth of a military requirement to ensure the flow of cheap oil from the Persian Gulf.80 But economists from across the political spectrum (including two Nobel Laureates -- the liberal James Tobin and the free marketer Milton Friedman) agree that going to war for oil is unneeded. The truth is that the Persian Gulf countries (including Iraq and Iran) have more incentive and need to ensure the flow and sale of oil (because their economies are almost wholly dependent on the export of this one commodity) than the United States and other developed countries have need to buy it (especially since the Persian Gulf is not the world's only source for oil). Ultimately, according to Donald Losman at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, "Although economic considerations have a role in grand strategy, economic goals per se are inappropriate as national security objectives"81 and that "economic security itself is best addressed by the market."82
Moreover, if either Iraq or Iran became a threat to the region, Saudi Arabia, the other oil-rich Persian Gulf nations, and Israel have the resources to act as a balancer-of-power. Indeed, reports that the Saudi monarchy might ask the United States to withdraw its forces from the kingdom83 suggests that balancing against the potential threat does not require a U.S. military presence in the region. That the Saudi monarchy is not supportive of U.S. military action against Iraq also speaks volumes about Iraq as a threat to the region.84
North Korea is considered a threat only because the United States insists on guaranteeing South Korea's security and stationing 37,000 troops on the Korean peninsula. But in the post-Cold War environment, there is no rationale for providing such a guarantee. Indeed, the Korean peninsula is not vital to the security of the United States and Doug Bandow (former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan) argues:
The ensuing years have rendered obsolete every assumption underlying the Mutual Defense Treaty. First, there is no more Cold War, during which Washington assumed that any regional conflict had global implications. A North Korean invasion-unlikely, given the shifting balance of power on the peninsula would no longer be tied to an expansive, hegemonic threat to the United States.Second, Pyongyang can no longer expect support from China and Russia, which armed and supported the DPRK during the Korean War… Third, the ROK is no longer backward economically or politically… Fourth, East Asia is no longer filled with weak neighbors, such as Japan and the Philippines, vulnerable to communist aggression…
In short, none of the original arguments for America's security commitment, backed not only by the 37,000 soldiers on the peninsula abut also the by the full military faith and credit of the Unitd States, now applies.85
Thus, North Korea is not a natural enemy to the United States and does not pose a direct threat unless the United States continues to interfere in regional politics and disputes. Such disagreements would be better resolved by the countries in the region, such as South Korea's "sunshine policy" of engagement with North Korea.
Conclusion
Although it seems obvious, it is worth reminding ourselves that the attacks of September 11 were carried out by the al Qaeda terrorist network under Osama bin Laden's leadership -- not North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. None of these countries is proved to be linked to the planning, financing, or execution of those attacks. And they are not known to support or provide safe harbor to al Qaeda as did the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. So naming them an "axis of evil" to justify expanding the war on terrorism seems premature at best and misguided at worst. Whatever potential threat the axis of evil might present (and that is highly debatable), one thing is certain: the clear and present danger is al Qaeda. And if al Qaeda is not known to be operating in or receiving support from the axis of evil, then threatening (and potentially taking military action against) those regimes will hardly prevent al Qaeda from re-grouping and possibly attacking the United States again.
In the rush to demonize the axis of evil, one thing should not be forgotten: prior to September 11, much of the national security focus of the Bush administration was on weapons of mass destruction and so-called rogue states (now the axis of evil) -- largely in the form of missile defense. The paradigm then (and now) was that of state-sponsored terrorism, i.e., that nation-states sponsored terrorist groups as an extension of policy and to realize political objectives. But this is exactly the wrong approach. Al Qaeda and the September 11 attacks demonstrate that terrorism has essentially been privatized. Bin Laden uses a business model for operating al Qaeda. The network does not require financial support from a sympathetic country. And the organization is not a tool of any country's particular policy or politics (although there might be confluence or overlap). Indeed, al Qaeda has its own political agenda and simply uses weak countries as fertile ground for breeding terrorism. But as a cellular organization that is not dependent on any one country or countries, simply removing regimes deemed unfriendly or hostile to the United States will not destroy al Qaeda.
Thus, Bush's concept of an axis of evil misses the mark. And any action taken against it will not be Saint George slaying the dragon, but simply flailing away at the chimera.
Notes
(1)"Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," September 20, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html.(2)Ibid.
(3)"Radio Address of the President to the Nation," October 6, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011006.html.
(4)Ibid.
(5)Ibid.
(6)"President Welcomes Aid Workers Rescued from Afghanistan," November 26, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011126-1.html
(7)Ibid. "Q: I'm just asking if you've expanded your definition to countries who don't just harbor terrorists, but also develop such weapons. THE PRESIDENT: Have I expanded the definition? I've always had that definition, as far as I'm concerned."
(8)Ibid.
(9)"President Speaks on War Effort to Citadel Cadets," December 11, 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011211-6.html.
(10)Ibid.
(11)"Wanted: Dead or Alive," abcNEWS.com, September 17, 2001, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/WTC_MAIN010917.html and "Bush: As long as it takes, dead or alive," CNN.com, December 28, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/12/28/gen.war.against.terror/
(12)"The President's State of the Union Address," January 29, 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.
(13)Ibid.
(14)Ibid.
(15)Quoted in Walter Pincus, "Tenet Says Al Qaeda Still Poses Threat," Washington Post, February 7, 2002, p. A1.
(16)Ibid.
(17)Philip Shenon and James Risen, "Qaeda Deputy Reported to Plan New Attacks," New York Times, February 14, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/14/international/asia/14TERR.html?todaysheadlines.
(18)Quoted in Juhn J. Lumpkin, "Al-Qaida Operations Found in Pakistan," Associated Press report on Yahoo! News, March 7, 2002, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20020307/ap_on_re_as/attacks_al_qaida_8&cid=535.
(19)"Operation Anaconda Costs 8 U.S. Lives," CNN.com, March 4, 2002, http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/03/04/ret.afghan.fighting/index.html.
(20)Quoted in Vernon Loeb and Bradley Graham, "American Troops Play Greater Role in Latest Offensive," Washington Post, March 4, 2002, p. A1.
(21)"The President's State of the Union Address."
(22)Ibid.
(23)Ibid.
(24)"Authorization for Use of Military Force (Agreed to by the House)," H. J. Res. 64, September 14, 2001.
(25)Even Philippine president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo admits that evidence of al Qaeda in the Philippines is only up until 1995, Lally Weymouth, "We Will Do The Fighting," interview with Philippine president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Washington Post, February 3, 2002, p. B1.
(26)Elisabeth Bumiller, "Bush Vows to Aid Other Counties in War on Terror," New York Times, March 11, 2001, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nyt/20020312/wl_nyt/bush_vows_to_aid_other_countries_in_war_on_terror.
(27)In a cryptic reference to the tense relationship between Georgia and Russia, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze said, "I think that partnership and cooperation with the United States is a good shield for Georgian security," quoted in Vladimir Isachenkov, "Russian parliament may push for recognizing independence of Georgian provinces," Associated Press, February 28, 2002. Georgia's Resonance daily newspaper was even more blunt: "The West clearly does not intend to let Georgia remain in Russia's sphere of influence," quoted in Niko Mchedlishvili, "Georgia Says Russia 'Hysterical' Over U.S. Troops," Reuters, February 28, 2002, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20020228/ts_nm/attack_military_dc_25.
(28)Rosalind Russell, "Georgia Special Operation May Reach Rebel Abkhazia," Reuters, March 15, 2002, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/nm/20020315/wl_nm/georgia_abkhazia_dc_1.
(29)By contrast, U.S. military aid and action in Yemen is more consistent with the joint congressional resolution because bin Laden and al Qaeda are known to have operated in Yemen and the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen is attributed to al Qaeda.
(30)Joseph Kahn, "Expanding Financial Assault on Terror, U.S. Penalizes Basque Group," New York Times, February 27, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/27/international/europe/_27ASSE.html. Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill characterized the E.T.A. as a terrorist organization of global reach and said, "Our crackdown on terrorists is blind to nationality and origin. It's a net being cast on all terrorist parasites that threaten our allies and our national security."
(31)Karen DeYoung, "U.S. May End Curbs On Aid to Colombia," Washington Post, March 15, 2002, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29575-2002Mar14.html.
(32)Quoted in David E. Sanger, "Bush Aides Say Tough Tone Put Foes on Notice," New York Times, January 31, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/31/international/31PREX.html?todaysheadlines.
(33)According to The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, axis means "an alliance of powers, such as nations, to promote mutual interests and policies," http://www.dictionary.com/search?q=axis.
(34)Federation of American Scientists, "Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)," http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101-ops-war-iran-iraq.htm.
(35)"Iran and Iraq discuss closer ties," CNN.com, January 26, 2002, http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/01/26/iran.iraq/.
(36)Defense Intelligence Agency, "North Korea: The Foundations for Military Strength," on the Federation of American Scientists website, http://www.fas.org/irp/dia/product/knfms/knfms_chp3a.html#HDR11.
(37)According to Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000, Congressional Research Service, August 6, 2001, on the Council for a Livable World website, http://www.clw.org/atop/grimmett2001_report.pdf, Russia had $500 million in military sales to Iran between 1993 and 2000. By comparison, "all others" (of which North Korea is just one country) sales to Iran for the same period totaled $300 million. Yet Russia is not considered part of an axis of evil with Iran.
(38)Ibid. "Precise figures on North Korea's arms trade, economy, and foreign trade balance are not available. Rough estimates indicate North Korea earned over $4 billion from 1981 through 1989. Arms sales during the peak year 1982 represented nearly 37 percent of North Korea's total exports."
(39)Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, "Global Threats and Challenges Through 2015," Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 7, 2001, http://www.dia.mil/Public/Press/statement01.html. For example: "Iran has a relatively large ballistic missile force -- hundreds of Chinese CSS-8s" and "Aided by China, Iran has developed a potent anti-ship cruise missile capability to threaten sea traffic from shore, ship, and aircraft platforms."
(40)Quoted in Sanger.
(41)Barbara Starr, "N. Korea, Iraq in Scud Pact?," August 10, 2000, abcNEWS.com, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/scuds081000.html.
(42)Ibid. The report even raised the question of "whether one of the key foreign players is for some reason laying a false paper trail to implicate all three countries."
(43)Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2000, http://www.cia.gov.cia/publications/bian/bian_jan_2002.htm.
(44)Ibid.
(45)Director of Central Intelligence, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015 December 2001.
(46)Federation of American Scientists, "DPRK Nuclear Weapons program," http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html: "On 22 April 1997, U.S. Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon officially stated, "When the U.S.-North Korea nuclear agreement was signed in Geneva in 1994, the U.S. intelligence authorities already believed North Korea had produced plutonium enough for at least one nuclear weapon.'"
(47)Michael Dobbs, "How Politics Helped Redefine Threat," Washington Post, January 14, 2002, p. A16.
(48)The No Dong program has reportedly been plagued by technical and financial problems. See Federation of American Scientists, "No Dong," http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/missile/nd-1.htm.
(49)Quoted in Dobbs.
(50)As a signatory to the CWC, Iran is obligated to destroy it stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of ratification (i.e., by 2007) and may provide an early test of the efficacy of the CWC.
(51)Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2000.
(52)Michael Eisenstadt, "Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in Iraq and Iran: Current Developments and Potential for Future Surprises," prepared for the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, March 23, 1998, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/ballistic.htm.
(53)Michael Dobbs, "A Story Of Iran's Quest for Power," Washington Post, January 13, 2002, p. A1 and pp. A18-19.
(54)Ibid., p. A18.
(55)Quoted in ibid., p. A19.
(56)Quoted in ibid.
(57)Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2000.
(58)Ibid.
(59)Eisenstadt.
(60)Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015.
(61)Ibid.
(62)Wilson. [emphasis added]
(63)Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. [emphasis added]
(64)Wilson.
(65)Ibid.
(66)Department of Defense, "Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review," January 9, 2002.
(67)U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, April 30, 2001, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2441.htm.
(68)Ibid.
(69)Ibid.
(70)For example, the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 1983 and the suicide truck bomb attack on the U.S. embassy that destroyed the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983. For a more complete discussion and analysis, see Ivan Eland, "Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism?," Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 50, December 17, 1998.
(71)U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, "ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there."
(72)Ibid.
(73)Ibid.
(74)These alleged meetings are the subject of continued heated debate. For example, columnist David Ignatius says the Czech government has backed away from from their reports about the meetings, "Dubious Iraqi Link," Washington Post, March 15, 2001, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A29957-2002Mar14.html, while columnist William Safire insists that such claims are disinformation, "Protecting Saddam," New York Times, March 18, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/18/opinion/18SAFI.html.
(75)"Atta met twice with Iraqi intelligence," CNN.com, October 11, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/10/11/inv.atta.meetings/.
(76)Quoted in Robert Novak, "No Iraqi connection," TownHall.com, October 15, 2001, http://www.townhall.com/columnists/robertnovak/rn20011015.shtml.
(77)Quoted in "Israel denies Iraqi terror attack link," BBC News, September 23, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/middle_east/newsid_1559000/1559353.stm.
(78)International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001-2002, London: Oxford University Press, October 2001.
(79)Ibid.
(80)See David R. Henderson, "The Myth of Saddam's Oil Stranglehold" and William A. Niskanen, "Oil, War, and the Economy" in America Entangled: The Persian Gulf Crisis and Its Consequences, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1991), pp. 41-45 and pp. 53-57.
(81)Donald Losman, "Economic Security: A National Secuurity Folly?," Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 409, August 1, 2001, p 1.
(82)Ibid., p. 10.
(83)David B. Ottaway and Robert G. Kaiser, "Saudis May Seek U.S. Exit: Military Presence Seen ss Political Liability in Arab World," Washington Post, January 18, 2002, p. A1.
(84)"Saudi prince says U.S. should not attack Iraq," CNN.com, March 15, 2002, http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/03/15/saudi.prince/index.html.
(85)Doug Bandow, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1996), p. 34.
A version of this article originally appeared in the Mediterranean Quarterly 13.3, Summer 2002.