

3. The Creation, Fall, Rise, and Fall of the United Nations

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American foreign policy must be based on identifying our vital national interests and then advancing and defending those interests around the world. We can do so in a variety of ways—through formal alliances such as NATO, through informal coalitions as we did in Desert Storm, or on our own if necessary, as we did in Grenada and Panama. Those were the successful ways in which Presidents Reagan and Bush protected American lives and interests for 12 years.

By contrast, the Clinton administration, from its outset, chose to rely heavily on the United Nations. The administration scorned traditional definitions of the national interest, welcomed the watering down of American influence that UN-centric diplomacy entailed, and ignored the loss of American independence and flexibility caused by becoming wrapped around the UN axle. Although the administration has been more circumspect about its policies recently—to the extent, that is, that we can guess what the policy is on any given day—the basic Clinton attitudes have never really disappeared. I believe that President Clinton—unconstrained because he will never have to face the voters again—will return to his UN-centered approach to foreign policy. His selection of Madeleine Albright, U.S. ambassador to the UN, to be secretary of state in his second term strongly suggests such an approach. America has been seriously harmed by Clinton's policy mistakes in the last four years and could be gravely weakened in his second term.

The 1996 election provides a useful vantage point, one year after the hype of the UN's 50th anniversary celebrations, from which to reflect on the organization's history and prospects. That history falls into two broad periods: (1) the first 40 years after the UN's founding in 1945 and (2) the last 11 years, corresponding to the second half of the Reagan-Bush period and the Clinton administration to date.

Original Intent: Creation and First Fall

After World War II there was broad, bipartisan support for creating an international organization to prevent another global conflict. The Preamble to the UN Charter speaks eloquently of the need “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”¹ Realistic American drafters, however, also carefully circumscribed the reach of the UN, by limiting its role to cases that presented a threat to “international peace and security,” in the hope of avoiding giving the UN a global license for international social work. American officials also insisted on veto power in the Security Council as a *sine qua non* for U.S. membership, to ensure that no majority of UN members could ever threaten our national interests.

The Soviet Union’s designs for global hegemony, and the Cold War they caused, largely consigned the idealistic original intent of the charter to gridlock and obscurity. Within just a few years after its founding, the UN was so obviously ineffective that the United States, and those in the world who shared our values, turned to more realistic approaches to protecting our basic national interests. Nuclear deterrence and strong political-military alliances such as NATO quickly became the preferred instruments for both protecting our liberty and preventing “the scourge of war.”

During the 1960s and 1970s anti-Western and anti-American UN General Assembly majorities regularly and enthusiastically trashed our values. Led by the Communist bloc, those dictatorial or authoritarian governments mocked democracy through resolutions in the General Assembly and other UN bodies in an attempt to advance a thoroughly anti-democratic agenda. They assaulted America’s world leadership and integrity in resolutions condemning U.S. foreign policies, year after year after year. They attacked our friends and allies, for example, in the 1975 General Assembly resolution that equated “Zionism” with “racism,” a blood libel of the legitimacy of the state of Israel. They undermined economic liberty and global prosperity by endorsing Soviet-backed policies such as the New International Economic Order, a socialist dream of forcing redistribution of wealth to the Third World. And, all the while, the UN bureaucracy grew and grew, just like a coral reef—no planning, no system, no goal, yet blessed with apparently eternal life.

Incredible as it may sound today, the Carter administration was hardly troubled by any of those developments. President Carter’s

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foreign policy team, much of which now serves President Clinton, thought that the hateful venom from the UN General Assembly was just a way for the Third World “to let off a little steam.” After all, they said, each nation has one vote in the General Assembly, and they acted as though each nation’s opinion was equally valid and entitled to the same deference. In the Carter years, America was just one more vote in the “parliament of man.”

Sensible Americans, however, realized that the idealism of 1945 had long since been replaced by an organization we no longer recognized. They rejected the UN for any mission of real importance to American foreign policy.² Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), former U.S. ambassador to the UN, correctly called it “a dangerous place” for American interests.³ Since the UN had turned away from its principal founder, it is no wonder that the United States turned away from the UN.

The Rise and Second Fall

When Ronald Reagan became president, things began to change. Congressional majorities were thoroughly disenchanted with the United Nations, and they announced a dramatic transformation in American policy: play time at the UN was over. The United States would no longer reflexively and automatically pay for the privilege of being savaged.

In the mid-1980s President Reagan actually withdrew the United States from the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) because it had become bloated and wasteful, served virtually no legitimate American interests, and routinely attacked liberties central to the health of free societies. (The withdrawal was a noteworthy achievement, which the Clinton administration sought to reverse by having the United States rejoin UNESCO. As of now, however, there is no serious prospect that the United States will *ever* rejoin UNESCO.)

In addition, Congress, during several annual appropriations cycles in the mid-1980s, refused to pay the full U.S. assessments to other parts of the UN system to protest the waste, fraud, and abuse that were so rampant throughout the UN and to protest the charade that the UN somehow amounted to a “parliament of man.” That may have been the most important development of all, because when

the U.S. financial gravy train slowed down, even the somnolent bureaucrats at the UN were shocked into attention.

The United States also took on the fundamental hypocrisy of many UN members by challenging the human rights record of Cuba and other leaders of the Third World. President Reagan appointed Armando Valladares as the U.S. representative to the UN Human Rights Commission, so he could tell the world directly about the Castro regime's brutality. The Communist bloc and Third World countries were shocked, and they acted as though the UN rules did not allow the United States to defend itself.

Suddenly, it was the United States that was "letting off steam," and a lot had been accumulating over the years. By so doing, the Reagan administration advanced American interests, instead of simply defending them against the constant attacks of the Soviets and their Third World sycophants. We rejected the Carterite counsel, those cynics posing as idealists, who said that the UN could never really be changed and that trying to do so was not worth the effort. In effect, we said, "Change, or else!" President Reagan always understood that standing up for U.S. interests in the UN never required an apology.

Americans welcomed that new assertiveness in our foreign policy. In fact, President Reagan's policy laid the groundwork for rare opportunities to use the Security Council constructively, especially as "new thinking" in Soviet policy emerged during his second term:

- In the late 1980s the UN helped negotiate and monitor the truce in the war between Iran and Iraq to help protect the world's oil supply from disruptions in the Persian Gulf.
- Under American leadership, the Security Council supervised a process that brought free and fair elections to Namibia, the last colony in Africa, thus leading it out of apartheid and into independence.
- The UN provided monitors at the end of major Cold War conflicts, as Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan and Cuban troops withdrew from Angola.

Thus, traditional UN peacekeeping techniques advanced American interests through the Security Council. Even in those instances, however, we must understand the limited role actually played by

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the UN. Traditional UN peacekeeping requires that any UN involvement have the consent of all of the parties to a dispute, that UN troops and civilian personnel act in a consistently neutral fashion, and that UN troops use force only when necessary for self-defense. And, in all of those cases, the UN was an instrument of American policy, not a policymaker itself.

Even more dramatic and important, in the Persian Gulf crisis, America led the Security Council to perform for the first and only time in its entire history as the charter's framers had intended. (The Soviet boycott of the council during the early stages of the 1950 Korean crisis was the principal reason the council was able to function on that occasion; unfortunately, when the Soviets resumed full participation, gridlock again ensued.) The UN authorized the U.S.-assembled international coalition to use force to defeat and reverse the unprovoked Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.

After Saddam Hussein's armies of aggression had been humiliated, America used the Security Council and the coalition's military forces in the unprecedented humanitarian rescue of the Iraqi Kurds. To provide at least some compensation for the victims of Iraq's invasion, we had the Security Council establish a system to force the Iraqis to pay compensation. Even more important, we created a program, endorsed by the Security Council, to find and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. By so doing, we hoped to make it impossible for Iraq ever again to threaten its neighbors or our vital interests in the Persian Gulf. In each of those instances, American leadership made the difference. And, in each of those cases, the UN was an instrument of that leadership—a useful instrument to be sure, but only an instrument.

In addition, the Reagan and Bush administrations prevailed upon the UN General Assembly to repeal the odious and hateful "Zionism is racism" resolution. We gained UN approval for economic sanctions against Libya's terrorist regime in retaliation for the mass murder of the passengers and crew of Pan Am Flight 103. We fostered democratic elections in Central America, clearing away another legacy of the Cold War, even as we continued to hammer away at the Castro regime in Cuba. We created the concept of the "unitary UN" as a systematic basis for sweeping reform of the galaxy of UN agencies, to reduce waste and mismanagement. We rolled back politicization in the specialized agencies, to try to reconcentrate them

on their technical missions rather than have them resolve such issues as whether the Palestine Liberation Organization was entitled to UN membership. Unfortunately, however, none of those accomplishments was easy, and the very difficulties we faced underscore the fundamental problems still remaining throughout the UN system.

Even so, the lesson was plain. When there was a vital U.S. interest at stake, the UN could serve a useful role as an instrument of U.S. policy. When the United States led, the UN could work.

Unfortunately, many misread or ignored that lesson, particularly then-governor Bill Clinton. He missed the point that the UN's "successes" after 1985 had been brought about by tough-minded American leadership. He did not see or understand that the UN was only an instrument of American policy, not the policy itself. He ignored the enormous effort that had been required to achieve even the first steps toward true reform in the UN system.

Even worse, Clinton took office believing that U.S. foreign policy could largely be run through the UN system. Indeed, in many respects, he and his advisers longed to make the conduct of American foreign policy subordinate to the UN, so uncomfortable were they with the unashamed, unembarrassed American leadership exercised by Presidents Reagan and Bush.

The Carter foreign policy team reemerged from hibernation, after 12 years of failing to learn from their own mistakes. Having given away the Panama Canal, been paralyzed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, been driven to their knees by the Communist-led Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua, been humiliated by the Iranian kidnapping of our diplomats in Teheran, and sabotaged our national defense readiness by inattention and ineptness, the Carter team came back for another turn at the plate.

This time led by the naive and inexperienced Bill Clinton, they proclaimed a policy of "assertive multilateralism."⁴ That policy, the meaning of which varied from day to day, was at best confused and at worst dangerous to U.S. interests. It clearly signaled, however, subordination of our international leadership, a turning away from a global role in the American Century, and a search for respite from hard choices. Even at the outset of his first term, we saw President Clinton tacking and triangulating, desperately trying to avoid the responsibility of U.S. leadership. After all, if foreign policy is always multilateral, there are plenty of others to bear the blame for failure.

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Throughout its foreign policy, and especially under the banner of assertive multilateralism, the administration displayed an instinct for the capillaries, pursuing illusory concepts unrelated to tangible U.S. national interests. In endless multilateral meetings, from Copenhagen to Cairo and from Beijing to Istanbul, Clintonites have talked and talked, while real international threats to America and its friends—from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to state-sponsored terrorism—have grown and grown.

President Clinton basically lost interest in American leadership, around the world generally and in the UN specifically. He forgot that the UN was an instrument to be used to advance *America's* foreign policy interests, not to engage in international social work and ivory-tower chattering. His policy was to commit the United States through the UN to major involvements in peripheral conflicts, with little or no thought to the risks and costs involved. The results of the Clinton policy were calamitous.

First came tragedy, death, and disgrace in Somalia. There, we saw Clintonite foreign policy in its most pristine form, before spin control and reelection politics were able to camouflage the substance. By turning a generous, humanitarian relief operation launched by President Bush, and unmistakably led by the United States, into a test case of assertive multilateralism, President Clinton eviscerated America's ability to lead its own operation and left American troops in considerable peril.

President Clinton decided that Somalia would be a fitting place to engage in something called "nation building." Former secretary of defense Les Aspin said explicitly on August 27, 1993, "We went there to save a people, and we succeeded. We are staying there now to help those same people rebuild their nation."⁵ It turned out that nation building was a vague and expansive policy President Clinton could neither understand nor implement.

By following misguided, dangerous policies in Somalia, the Clinton administration achieved what might have seemed impossible: it took a desert country and turned it into a quagmire for the United States. Eighteen Americans died in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, because of assertive multilateralism. Still, President Clinton did not understand. Instead, he sent Secretary Aspin and Secretary of State Warren Christopher to brief Congress. The *Wall Street Journal* reported that Secretary Aspin was "the picture of confusion" and

“contradictory in his statements,” and that Secretary Christopher “sat virtually silent.”⁶ So much for American leadership. Unfortunately, the whole world saw the entire episode as an example of U.S. policy disarray.

Next came neglect, indecision, and hypocrisy in the former Yugoslavia. To avoid hard choices, President Clinton sought to pawn off responsibility for Bosnia on the seemingly anonymous UN and the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Thoroughly misunderstanding the nature of UN peacekeeping, the administration urged conflicting and inconsistent mandates on UNPROFOR and then failed to supply basic political leadership to correct the mess it had made.⁷

Virtually the president’s first action after his inauguration was to torpedo the Vance-Owen peace plan. While there was much to object to in that plan, the administration had no substitute of its own, other than platitudes, and no idea what to do once it had vitiated the very strategy it had called for while campaigning. Even when it managed to generate policy ideas, the administration failed to lead the Western alliance. For many Americans—and our allies—the low point came early in 1993 when Secretary Christopher was sent to “consult” with other NATO members about an alliance strategy for the former Yugoslavia. To their amazement, the NATO governments found that Christopher had no real plan to offer.⁸

Then, even after the debacle in Somalia, the Clinton administration watched passively as UNPROFOR, in both its military and its civilian capacities, became ever more entwined with NATO efforts. Fundamental political-military issues such as command relationships, lines of operational control, and ultimate political responsibility were hopelessly muddled. Assertive multilateralism came more and more to look like mass confusion. All the while, the Bosnian Muslim victims of Serbian aggression were denied the means of defending themselves because of the administration’s interpretation of an out-of-date Security Council weapons embargo.

That abdication of American leadership only made the ongoing tragedy of the former Yugoslavia worse. Ultimately, U.S. hesitancy required a much larger and riskier American presence on the ground than would have been needed had President Clinton not sought cover under the UN. Stronger American leadership earlier would have obviated the need to place so many in harm’s way and to keep them in Bosnia for the lengthy period to which the administration has agreed.⁹

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And while American lives were put at risk in UN missions by President Clinton, inattention to the UN's underlying management problems resulted in waste and paralysis in the UN system. We should not be surprised that the administration has been as unsuccessful in restraining waste, fraud, and abuse throughout the UN system as it has been in restraining domestic federal spending. In fact, as was the case in the 1980s, the only thing keeping UN expenditures in line is the withholding of payments by Congress, once again outraged at the UN's lack of responsiveness to true management reform.

But more is at stake here than just wasting American tax dollars, although that is bad enough. By the Clinton administration's own admission, it has deceived the American public about UN reform for the last four years. During testimony before congressional committees, in public speeches, and in private conversations, the Clinton team argued repeatedly that Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was committed to major administrative and management reform. They made those claims even after the American under secretary-general for management and administration, selected by the Clinton administration, was fired for being unsuited for the job. They made those claims even after the first Office of UN Inspector General was exposed as a toothless watchdog. And they even made those claims while the secretary-general was recalling and shredding the comprehensive report on UN reform by former under secretary-general Richard Thornburgh.¹⁰

While uttering the demonstrable falsehood that Boutros-Ghali was serious about reform, the Clinton administration acted as though continued concern in Congress about UN waste, fraud, and abuse was the equivalent of bean counting. "All is well," said the Clinton team, "just pay the U.S. assessment, and our problems will be solved. Boutros-Ghali is on top of UN reform, and Congress needs to get behind him and his cost-cutting efforts." Boutros-Ghali strongly supported the Clinton policy of assertive multilateralism, and the president seemed to stand by his man. Indeed, Ambassador Albright scorned U.S. critics of the UN by saying, "Maybe their problem with the UN is that there are just too many foreigners there, but that can't be helped."¹¹

Imagine the surprise, then, when the Clinton administration announced that Boutros-Ghali was being thrown off the train, obviously as an unnecessary obstacle to the president's reelection efforts.

Suddenly, the hero of UN reform had become an albatross. But what does that casual, Clintonite stab in the back tell us about three and a half years of assurances to Congress and the American public that all was well with UN reform? It should make clear that UN reform was nothing more than another pose, another foreign policy charade, by a president who changes policies like some people change clothes.

The administration professes to be deeply involved in the Middle East peace process, yet the public cat fight with Boutros-Ghali has humiliated the government of Egypt, a key actor in that process, and embarrassed the United States. Ironically, many supporters of Boutros-Ghali still hoped that President Clinton would win reelection, believing that, having successfully fooled the American people, the president would turn around and acquiesce in Boutros-Ghali's reelection. The final administration decision to veto Boutros-Ghali was, in fact, almost certainly motivated by fear of the domestic U.S. political consequences of not carrying out the threat. The result of Clinton's failed UN policies is that American interests are in retreat across the board, and the organization itself is virtually paralyzed.

Climbing Out of the Ditch

So, what do we do now? Some Americans simply want to withdraw from the United Nations, believing that it can never really be fixed. I understand the frustrations and the disappointments that lead to that view, even though I disagree with it. We should tell the world community instead, "Let's make one last effort to put things right in the UN. And make no mistake, our patience is not unlimited." We should stress the following specifics.

The New Secretary-General Must Deliver on Reform

President Clinton ambushed incumbent Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. Now, after the fact, the administration has, through press leaks, taken credit for covertly supporting the ultimately successful candidate, Kofi Annan of Ghana. However, the administration's mishandling of the entire Boutros-Ghali affair, ironically, made it even more difficult than before to elect a secretary-general who sees the world—and the UN—the way we do.

So eager was the administration to appease those who argued that Africa was *entitled* to its candidate for a second term in the secretary-general's position, that it acquiesced in a Security Council procedure virtually guaranteed to produce an African winner.

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Indeed, the administration seemed so desperate that it led many to believe that it might accept Salim A. Salim, the head of the Organization of African Unity. He is the man who, as Tanzania's ambassador to the UN in 1971, danced joyously in the General Assembly's aisles when Taiwan was denied representation in the UN over American objections.

The winner, Kofi Annan, was certainly preferable to Salim. Virtually all of Annan's career has been within the UN system, frequently in management and personnel positions. Few know "the system" better than Annan. He is, therefore, in the best possible position to deliver on reform, for bureaucratic trials, jargon, and obfuscation are not likely to distract him if he is truly engaged. From January 1, 1997, forward, the world can judge his performance—and his will.

But one should not invest excessive hope in any secretary-general. The UN Charter describes the secretary-general as the UN's "chief administrative officer." He is not the president of the world. He is not a diplomat for all seasons. He is not Mr. Friend of the Earth. And, most definitely of all, he is not the commander in chief of the World Federalist Army. He is the *chief administrative officer*. Nothing less than that, to be sure, but, with even greater certainty, nothing more.

Stick with Traditional UN Peacekeeping

Traditional UN peacekeeping, together with the often-important role the agencies of the UN system play in the international delivery of humanitarian assistance, can work and should be continued. Although peacekeeping has had only limited use throughout much of the UN's history, it is an option that we should preserve for appropriate use, such as the UN Disengagement Observer Force along the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria.

What should be relegated to history's junk pile at the first opportunity, however, are the chimerical Clinton notions of UN "peace enforcement," "nation building," and "enlargement." Those unworldly concepts have resulted in American personnel and resources being committed to UN operations far removed from vital American interests. Those concepts are based on misreadings of what happened in the world and in the UN in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In fact, they represent the triumph of those who have always felt uncomfortable with American world leadership, those

who prefer a subdued, tamed America to one that unashamedly proclaims its vision and its interests.

Most important of all, American troops should almost never be placed under UN command. Americans face unique risks of being targeted, captured, and killed by fanatics and lunatics, as the tragic case of Colonel Higgins in Lebanon proved so dramatically just a few years ago. Even in traditional peacekeeping, with only the rarest exceptions where the highest American interests are at stake, Americans should not wear blue helmets—that is, participate in peacekeeping forces. In fact, we should revive the convention, which served us well for many years, that no troops from the five permanent members of the Security Council be involved in UN peacekeeping.

We should also reverse the Clinton administration's policy of indiscriminately sharing sensitive intelligence information with the UN Secretariat. That fuzzy-minded policy risks exposing sensitive intelligence sources and methods, as well as degrading our ability to act rapidly and independent of the UN when we choose to do so. When it serves palpable and immediate U.S. interests, such as helping to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, we should consider limited exceptions, but only on a case-by-case basis and under the strictest possible safeguards. For similar reasons, there is no need to create any intelligence-gathering capability in the UN itself.

Finally, even in traditional peacekeeping operations, forces under UN command should operate under the control of the Security Council, not under that of the secretary-general. That is the arrangement the framers of the UN Charter intended, and we should require it. The chief administrative officer of the UN should stick to administration and stay out of military matters.

Do Not "Reform" the Security Council

Yet another example of the Clinton administration's pie-in-the-sky approach to the world was evidenced right at the start by the desire of officials to remake the Security Council through a kind of international quota system. Following theories that only liberal academics take seriously, the administration wanted to enlarge the council; add new permanent members, balanced geographically, perhaps on a rotating basis; and throw in additional nonpermanent members as well.¹² The next step, of course, would be the elimination

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of the veto power, the single greatest protection the United States has in the UN.

The bottom line is, leave the veto alone, and leave the Security Council's membership alone. Presidents Reagan and Bush worked hard to fix the council. The desire to remold the Security Council now to conform to theoretical models of contemporary global politics should not obscure our present ability to make the council function effectively, at least in certain circumstances.

Management and Financial Reform Remains Essential

We know what needs to be done to eliminate wasteful overstaffing; overlapping agency jurisdictions; endless and duplicative international conferences, meetings, and publications; and corruption and favoritism in contracting and procurement. If we revitalized the unitary UN approach to management and budget issues, we would have a comprehensive framework by which to judge our strategy and our progress, instead of the episodic, anecdotal, and uncoordinated efforts of the Clinton administration. Congress, on a bipartisan basis, should simply no longer tolerate waste, fraud, and abuse in the UN system.

Even more important, and of far more long-range significance, we need a dramatic change in the way UN agencies are financed. President Clinton's favorite professors already have their own idea—they want to give the United Nations the authority to tax various international transactions.¹³ That authority would give the UN a revenue base independent of its member governments, a prospect that warms the hearts of those who do not much like the influence of the United States to begin with. Such proposals are completely unacceptable.

Congress has already pointed us in the right direction by ordering that the U.S. share of the cost of peacekeeping operations be no higher than its present assessment level in most UN specialized agencies—25 percent of the overall budget. We should go further and eliminate assessments altogether, moving toward a UN system that is funded entirely by purely voluntary contributions from the member governments. Such a system of voluntary contributions would allow each government to judge for itself whether it was getting its money's worth from the UN and each of its component agencies.

That would go a long way toward making the UN system responsive to the major contributors—especially to the United States, the largest contributor of all. If we were displeased with an agency's actions, we would simply lower our voluntary contribution until our views were taken seriously. For those agencies that were doing particularly good work, we might even consider a contribution level higher than our present assessment. And, if things were really bad, we should follow Ronald Reagan's example and withdraw from one or two agencies. That would really get their attention.

We need to explain to our allies just how serious we are about reform, make sure they understand the strength of our opinions, and persuade them to "get with the program" on unitary UN reform. That task is a major challenge for American leadership generally in the international system, including in the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the regional development banks. It is a challenge that the Clinton administration has failed utterly to meet.

Face Reality

Above all, let us be realistic about the United Nations. It can be a useful tool in the American foreign policy kit. The UN should be used when and where we choose to use it to advance American national interests, not to validate academic theories and abstract models. But the UN is only a tool, not a theology. It is one of several options we have, and it is certainly not invariably the most important one.

Conclusion

The UN has arisen, fallen, risen, and fallen again in our esteem, all in just 51 years, and especially in the last 11. The UN was an admirable concept when conceived; it has served our purposes from time to time; and it is worth keeping alive for future service. But it is not worth the sacrifice of American troops, American freedom of action, or American national interests. The real question for the future is whether we will know how to keep our priorities straight.

Notes

1. *Charter of the United Nations* (San Francisco: United Nations, June 26, 1945), Preamble, p. 1.

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2. See, for example, *Report on the U.S. and the U.N.: A Balance Sheet*, ed. Burton Yale Pines (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1984); and Harris O. Schoenberg, *A Mandate for Terror: The United Nations and the PLO* (New York: Shapolsky, 1989).
3. Daniel P. Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).
4. Thomas W. Lippman, "African Crises Test Limited U.S. Commitment," *Washington Post*, June 13, 1993, p. A33.
5. Quoted in John Lancaster, "Aspin Lists U.S. Goals in Somalia," *Washington Post*, August 28, 1993, p. A1.
6. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and David Rogers, "Clinton to Set Pullout Date for Somalia but Plans to Boost Troop Strength First," *Wall Street Journal*, October 7, 1993, p. A3.
7. John Hillen, "Killing with Kindness: The UN Peacekeeping Mission in Bosnia," *Cato Foreign Policy Briefing* no. 34, June 30, 1995.
8. Daniel Williams and John M. Goshko, "Reduced U.S. World Role Outlined but Soon Altered," *Washington Post*, May 26, 1993, p. A1.
9. William Drozdiak, "NATO Endorses New Bosnia Mission," *Washington Post*, November 19, 1996, p. A16.
10. Dana Priest, "House Votes to Reduce Payments to UN," *Washington Post*, February 17, 1995, p. A1.
11. Quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, "Dissing the World," *New York Times*, February 19, 1995, p. E13.
12. Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighborhood* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 233–41.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 296–302.

